Security policy
Stealth Web Search gives whoever can reach it a browser that runs on your machine, and it runs sub-agents that read untrusted web pages. Security reports are welcome.
Supported versions
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.1.x | Yes |
| Older | No |
Fixes are made on the latest release. curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8931/healthz shows the version you run (version) and the Obscura version (obscura.version).
Reporting a vulnerability
Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub. Do not open a public issue, discussion or pull request for them.
- Open the repository's Security tab and choose Report a vulnerability, or go straight to the private report form.
- Describe the problem and its impact, the version (the
/healthzoutput), how you run the server (Docker or npm, and any non-default settings), and the steps to reproduce it. A minimal page or script that triggers it helps most. - Leave out real secrets. Replace API keys, tokens, cookies and private addresses with placeholders, and redact logs and transcripts before you attach them: they can contain page content, typed text and URLs. Never attach snapshot files: they hold live sign-ins.
Only you and the maintainers can see the report. The maintainers follow up in the advisory.
Scope
The server is a remote-control port for a browser. Reports about these areas are in scope:
- The MCP endpoint and the dashboard. Reaching
/mcpor the dashboard without the bearer token whenAUTH_TOKENis set, getting around the Host and Origin checks (DNS-rebinding protection), or the dashboard leaking data it should redact. - The browser guards. Opening
file:orjavascript:URLs, or reaching private networks (localhost, RFC 1918 addresses,host.docker.internal) whileALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORKisfalse, through any tool, sub-agent or script. - Prompt injection that breaks a boundary. Pages are untrusted input, and a model can be talked into things by text on a page. That on its own is a known risk (see below). It is in scope when page content makes the server do something its guards should prevent, such as reaching a blocked address, reading another browser's cookies, or escaping a sub-agent's isolated browser.
- The script sandbox. Automation scripts run in a QuickJS WebAssembly sandbox with no Node.js APIs and with memory, time and call limits. Any way for a script to reach the file system, the network, processes or the host outside the guarded
browserobject, or to get around those limits, is in scope. - Isolation between browsers. Sub-agent and script browsers seeing the shared browser's tabs or cookies, or each other's. The one intended bridge is a snapshot the host passes to
agent_run: a sign-in reaching a browser nobody passed it to is in scope. - Secret redaction. Passwords, cookie values or credential headers reaching logs, transcripts or the dashboard while
LOG_REDACT_SECRETSistrue. Whatever that setting says: the host'sagent_replyanswers reaching the tool or MCP logs, a secret answer (a one-time code) reaching logs, transcripts, results or the dashboard, or snapshot cookie and storage values reaching any of them. - Snapshots (saved sign-ins). Snapshot files readable by other users than the server's, a weakness in their encryption with
SNAPSHOTS_KEY, a deleted snapshot coming back, or a cross-site request that gets past the checks ofDELETE /api/snapshots/<name>(the customX-SBM-Requestheader, theOrigincheck andSec-Fetch-Site). - Sub-agent questions. Page content or the model setting the
asked onorigin of a question (the server reads it from the agent's browser), or an answer reaching another question than the one itsquestion_idnames. In anagent_runoragent_automatejob, a click, form submit, or Enter or Space from the browser tools that presses a button labelled as the final step of an order or payment (such as Place your order or Pay now) before the host answered aconfirmquestion the agent asked on that page, whatever the job'spurchase_approvalsays. - The container. Anything that breaks the hardening in
compose.yamland theDockerfile(non-root user, read-only filesystem, dropped capabilities,no-new-privileges, the CDP port staying inside the container). - The helper scripts. For example
npm run lmstudio:setupwriting a token to a file that others can read, or the stdio bridge exposing the server.
Known limitations (not vulnerabilities)
These are documented and expected. Reports that only restate them are out of scope, but ways to make them worse than described are welcome.
- Obscura's cross-site cookie handling. Obscura v0.2.2 does not enforce Chromium's cross-site request protections: it sends
SameSite=Strict/Laxcookies on cross-site requests and treatsapplication/jsonPOSTs as simple requests (no CORS preflight). A page the agent visits can make cross-site requests that carry any cookies you gave the browser. This is an Obscura limitation: report changes to it to Obscura. - Prompt injection as such. A model can be manipulated by text on a page. Keep a human in the loop for sensitive accounts.
- The CDP socket in local development. Running the server directly (
npm run dev) exposes an unauthenticated Obscura CDP socket on127.0.0.1while it runs. The Docker image keeps it inside the container. - Settings that turn protections off. Publishing the port beyond
127.0.0.1withoutAUTH_TOKEN,ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=true,LOG_REDACT_SECRETS=false, orallow_evaluate: trueon a run started with a snapshot. - Free text in logs. Task texts, the agent's notes and its transcript are logged as they are. Of the text the agent types, only values typed into password-like fields, and the host's secret answers, are masked. Snapshot descriptions are logged and shown to sub-agents.
- Secret answers reach the model. A one-time code the host sends with
agent_replyis masked in logs, transcripts and on the dashboard, but the sub-agent's model endpoint receives it, because the agent has to type it. Masking works by value: the whole answer and its code-like parts (words of 4 or more characters with a digit, and digit groups), at least 4 characters each. Plain words of a secret answer, and a code the agent rewrites (for example with spaces added), are not masked. A code typed into a page can also show up in what the page itself shows or sends: the live view, and the page's console and network entries. - The purchase guard is a second line of defense. In
agent_runandagent_automatejobs the server refuses the final order or payment button until the host answered aconfirmquestion the agent asked on that page. It recognizes the button by its label, and only for clicks, form submits and Enter or Space from the browser tools. Page scripts andbrowser_evaluate, a checkout URL opened directly, a page's own key handlers, Enter in a form without a submit button, buttons with other wording or no label, and stored scripts (including thescript_testruns of anagent_automateagent) are not covered, and any answer to aconfirmquestion lifts it on the page the question was asked on. Apurchase_approvalnever lifts it: it only tells the host what it may approve without asking you. - A snapshot hands over an account. A browser that loads a snapshot is signed in as that account, and so is every page it opens: with Obscura's cross-site cookie handling (above), a page a signed-in sub-agent visits can make signed-in requests to the site. Snapshots reach a sub-agent only when the host passes one to
agent_run, and those runs get nobrowser_evaluateunless the host allows it. - Restored cookies reach subdomains. Obscura does not report whether a cookie was host-only, so a snapshot restores every cookie as a domain cookie, which is also sent to the site's subdomains. Report changes to this to Obscura.
- The end-of-run refresh saves the browser's final sign-in. A job started with a snapshot saves its browser's cookies back when it succeeds. It is skipped when saved sign-in cookies are missing (a signed-out browser), but a page that signs the agent in to another account under the same cookie names would be saved into the snapshot.
update_snapshot: falseturns the refresh off. - Snapshots at rest. Snapshot state files hold live session cookies. They are private to the server's user (0600 in a 0700 folder) and encrypted only when
SNAPSHOTS_KEYis set. Anyone who can read the volume, and.envif a key is set, can use those sign-ins. - Pages in the server's own browsers. With
ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=trueand noAUTH_TOKEN, a page open in the server's browsers can reach the server itself (/mcpand the dashboard), because Obscura does not enforce CORS the way Chromium does. SetAUTH_TOKENwhen you allow private networks. - The health check.
/healthzanswers without the bearer token and for any Host header, because the Docker health check uses it. It shows the versions, the engine status and arguments (with proxy passwords masked), and the number of tabs and sessions. - Engine crashes. When a page crashes Obscura, the server restarts it and tells the agent its tabs were reset. Report reproducible crashes to Obscura unless they break a boundary listed above.
Hardening your deployment
A summary of the Security section of the README:
- Keep the port on
127.0.0.1, ascompose.yamlpublishes it. Do not change it to0.0.0.0unless you setAUTH_TOKENand put a TLS reverse proxy in front. - Set
AUTH_TOKENif anyone else can reach the port. It protects/mcpand the dashboard. Add reverse-proxy hostnames toALLOWED_HOSTS. - Keep
ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=falseunless the browser must open sites on your machine or LAN. If you turn it on, setAUTH_TOKEN: pages in the server's own browsers can then reach the server. - Prefer Docker over
npm run devon shared or multi-user machines. - Keep
OBSCURA_SEPARATE_ENGINE=true(the default), so sub-agent and script browsers run on a second Obscura process: a page that crashes the engine there cannot reset your browser. WithOBSCURA_STORAGE_DIRthe second process is always used, and it never sees the persisted cookies. - Do not persist sensitive logins with
OBSCURA_STORAGE_DIR, and clear cookies (browser_clear_cookies) before sending the agent to untrusted sites. - Set
SNAPSHOTS_KEYso saved sign-ins are encrypted at rest, keep thesnapshotsvolume private, and never pointSNAPSHOTS_DIRinto the logs (the server refuses). Pass a snapshot toagent_runonly for jobs on that site, and keepallow_evaluateoff. SetAGENT_SNAPSHOT_SAVE=falseif sub-agents should never save sign-ins. See Snapshots. - Have your agent relay sub-agent questions that approve a purchase, payment, message or deletion, and requests for sign-in codes, to you, and never send a password with
agent_reply. When you approve a purchase in advance, give its limits (item, quantity, maximum total): your agent passes your words aspurchase_approvaland approves only a checkout that matches them, and asks you about anything else. See Questions from sub-agents. - Pass
update_snapshot: falseto jobs started with a snapshot that open pages you do not trust, so the end-of-run refresh cannot save another account into the snapshot. - Keep
LOG_REDACT_SECRETS=true, and do not put secrets into sub-agent tasks. If you must, setAGENT_TRANSCRIPTS=false,LOG_FILE_LEVEL=warnandLOG_LEVEL=warn. - Keep API keys out of the repository:
.envandconfig/models.jsonare gitignored, andconfig/models.jsoncan read the key from an environment variable with${VAR}. - Treat every page the agent visits as untrusted, and keep a human in the loop for sensitive accounts.
More detail: Configuration, Sub-agents, Snapshots and Logging.